multiculturalism as a political and philosophical theory of social justice, I shall argue in the third part of the article for the need to theorise multiculturalism in history. Ultimately, I propose, citizenship in the 21 st twenty first century, and even before that, is not permanently fixed by universalist philosophical principles, whether liberal or socialist, but is changing and dialogical, inventive and responsive to world events, a negotiated political order.
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An intractable occupational hazard anthropologists who study ethnicity and migration have had to contend with in the past two decades relates to the concept of culture. Although historically the discipline claims expertise in the study culture(s), at the present deconstructive moment such claims provoke accusations of neocolonial comments, and especially to Nonja Peters and Bob Pokrant.
all the great and simple things that make us human. (Sivanandan 1990: 51) According to Ruth Levitas, New Labour 'policy statements, speeches and interviews are saturated with a communitarian rhetoric about obligations and responsibilities ' of community (1998: 121) . By contrast to these moralistic invocations, in Ronald Frankenberg's early study of a Welsh border village, community is defined by intimate gossip ('Pentre people are those whom other Pentre people gossip with and about. ... they take little interest in the personal affairs of "outsiders"') (Frankenberg 1957: 20-21) ; by impenetrable local conflicts; by cross-cutting divisions along gender, religion, language and class lines; by kinship and affinal networks; and by a continuous tendency to define and redefine insiders and outsiders (Frankenberg 1957 and 1966) . By 1953, most Pentre men worked outside the community, yet the community continued to exist, mobilised around recreational activities, many of which were run by the women, who remained in the village while the men travelled beyond its boundaries.
I have argued -and this is illustrated by the complexity of the village community 6 For a brilliant analysis of New Labour discourses of social inclusion, social cohesion and community see Levitas (1998) . 7 For superb discussions of the expansion and internal contradictions of the notion of 'community' in and local electoral politics, and in local political and state rhetoric, race relations legislation and resource allocation, see Eade (1991) and Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992:162-198) .
studied by Frankenberg -that rather than denying the existence of community, one should theorise its heterogeneity: its ideological, political, cultural and social divisions, on the one hand, and its situationally changing boundaries, on the other (Werbner 2002 ).
This tendency of community towards fission and fusion was highlighted in the aftermath of the September 11 attack, when a coalition of Muslims and non-Muslims emerged in profound agreement, for joint action: the UK Stop the War cross-ethnic alliance incorporated Muslims as equal partners into the anti-war peace movement.
Alliance and segregation
Given that the limits of community are not fixed but are changing, situational and permeable, and given also that communities interpenetrate and cross-cut one another, how are we to regard a British Home Office Report, Community Cohesion, that investigated the summer riots in Northern towns and cities (Cantle 2001) ? The report pointed to very high levels of segregation between Asians and whites in schools and neighbourhoods. Adults interviewed claimed to have little interaction across the ethnic divide. Not economic deprivation or racism, or the sense of threat to community provoked by the presence of racist organisations in the towns where the riots took place, but a lack of community cohesiveness and leadership were thus blamed in the report for the riots. In response, Mr. Blunkett advised the Asian community in Britain to 'integrate', adopt British 'norms of acceptability', swear allegiance to the crown in public ceremonies, learn English, speak it at home, and look for spouses for their children from within the 'settled' Asian community in Britain, not overseas (Guardian, The Editor, Dec.15: 5).
It is significant that the Bradford or Oldham communities that were said to lack leadership and cohesiveness were not conceived of as exclusively Asian or white -they included both, obliterating difference. What was thus racialised, pathologised and indeed criminalized, was the internal social cohesiveness and cultural distinctiveness of the ethnic community, and secondarily, of the white working class communities living in the inner city adjacent to it. This was signalled by the report's first recommendation that communities needed to be (re)educated so that the rights and responsibilities of citizenship 'be more clearly established' (Cantle 2001: 46) 8 . In this spirit, Mr. Blunkett criticised South Asian inter-continental arranged marriages: 'We need to be able to encourage people to respond particularly to young women who do actually want to be able to marry someone who speaks their language -namely English -who has been educated in the same way as they have, and has similar social attitudes' (Neiyyar 2002: 4) . In stressing the need for communication in English, Mr. Blunkett's primary concern was clearly not the individual's right to choose, against culture, but the collective good of the 'community'. His paternalistic advice to Asian parents was to make paternalistic decisions on behalf of their children in accord with the interests of the wider national community, for the sake of social integration. Objecting to the straitjacket of political correctness, Mr. Blunkett argued for the need to open up a frank public dialogue with and within the Asian community (Blackstock 2002: front page) . But at the same time he went out of his way to claim that he recognised and respected the cultural diversity of British society.
In making his somewhat paradoxical pronouncements, Mr. Blunkett appeared to think that the situation in Bradford and Oldham was symptomatic of a broader malaise.
The reality in Oldham, as elsewhere in Britain, is, of course, a good deal more complex and varied than depicted by the report, a complexity highlighted by Lyon's research on community theatre in Oldham (Lyon 1997) . The play at the centre of her study, 'Chips and Chapati', was performed by a multi-ethnic and multi-racial local amateur group in Oldham, and it invoked the cultural hybridity of the immigrant experience in the city. At the start of rehearsals the Bangladeshi actors objected to the title. Chapati, they argued, was the Punjabi national staple diet, not theirs. Their culture was being effaced. The play should be called, they thought, Chips and Rice, but, fortunately or unfortunately, it was too late -the title of the play had been fixed in the drama festival's programme long in advance of the start of rehearsals.
8 Despite the language adopted and the dubious quality of the 'research' on which the report was based, many of its 67 policy recommendations for building bridges and mutual understanding and dialogue across the different communities were positive, practical, and implied the need to inject some new resources into the concerned areas. Some of the report's recommendations were later included in the Home Office White
It mattered to some of the actors that it should be rice, not chapati. Little details of culture matter to cultural actors. As transnational migrants sink roots in a new country they transplant and naturalise cultural categories, not simply because this is their tradition and culture, but because as active agents they have a stake in particular aspects of their culture. Culture as a medium of social interaction confers agency within a field of power relations.
Culture as a field of relatedness, agency and power
This was exemplified by the migration of Pakistanis to Britain, which was marked by the development of increasingly complex fields of relatedness as the process of community formation gathered pace (Werbner 1990 (Werbner /2002 Pakistani migration to Britain -and particularly to its major urban centres such as Manchester -included from the start a sizeable elite of educated students and middleclass professionals (doctors, accountants, solicitors), a growing business community, working-class 'big men', and organic cultural and religious intellectuals, all of whom have competed historically for leadership within and beyond the community.
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Growing wealth has created growing class distinctions among South Asians in 10 Biradari refers to the localised kinship and affinal caste group, often an ego-focused network. 
Culture as Embodiment
Culture, then, is a crucial medium of transaction, and hence of relatedness, for incoming migrants. It is also an embodied performance. Part of the move away from functionalist or essentialised notions of culture in social anthropology has been to approach culture as performance. 14 In sociology, Durkheim's analysis of the corrobori in The Elementary
Forms of Religious Life has been taken to point the way to a sociology of the body that encompasses the aesthetic aspects of social life (Shilling 1997) . Similarly, in the case of Pakistani migrants, ritual performance is an aesthetic experience that is powerfully The first figure is that of the Pakistani bride, who forms the symbolic focus of 13 see Werbner (1986 Werbner ( , 1990 Werbner ( /2002 ; for South Asia see Raheja and Gold (1994) .
14 This has been associated with the Manchester School's extended case study method or 'social drama', and particularly the work of Victor Turner (1958) and Max Gluckman (1940) . A parallel move in American cultural anthropology is the work of Clifford Geertz (1973) , who defines cultural performance as 'text', an idea similar to the move in Cultural Studies (e.g. Hebdige) . This is, however, a difference between a view of cultural performance as text in the work of Geertz or Hebdige, for example, and studies which highlight more specific symbolic interactionist processes within such performances. Such processual approaches, was a feature of the Manchester School's approach exemplified in Frankenberg's study of the rise and fall of the football club in Pentre. Missing, however, from such accounts is the recognition that culture in performance does not simply exemplify communication or social conflict -it represents an experience of embodiment and hence identity. Pakistani weddings in the UK. Like all South Asian brides, she is regarded as a wonderful, marvellous gift, and she must therefore leave her natal home bedecked in precious jewellery, a queen or goddess. Her person, in other words, is glorified by her adornment and beauty. An undecorated bride, without a shimmering red silk outfit and golden ornaments, is a sad sight, a shame to her family. Her decoration has been made possible by both her own family and that of her future affines. Beneath her glorious wedding outfit, the Pakistani bride is also ritually pure and fertile. She has been fed and smeared with substances that move her from a state of sexual innocence to a state of sexuality -initially dangerous but finally legitimate and approved. Among other ritual acts, her hands and feet have been decorated with mehndi, that is, henna, a cold, purifying and protective substance that is transformed into something red and hot.
The move of the bride and groom is from maternal nurture to dangerous eroticism, and ultimately to safe sexuality and conjugal nurture in marriage. This transfer of qualities via substances, the 'magical' treatment of the bride and groom, both protects them and joins them together, to ensure the fertility and legitimacy of the union, before it is legalised and consummated.
In many weddings held in the UK the young friends of the bride celebrate the coming wedding with transvestite masquerading, much like their English counterparts in their stag parties and hen nights. Hence, juxtaposed against the figure of the idealised bride is the transvestite figure of the ritual clown, usually an ugly old man, who often appears in the mehndi ritual. The appearance of this figure is also the occasion for sexual joking and explicitly vulgar gestures. These enact dramatically an oblique critique of arranged marriages with disgusting older men. So too, explicitly sexy, jokey gifts allow the bride's girlfriends to introduce into the ritual locally produced, British, symbolic objects. These are used to parody the sexual freedom and promiscuity of contemporary British society, contrasted creatively with the specifically Pakistani ideas about purdah and ritual modesty.
The ritual clown may be conceived of as a ritual monster, often found in rites of passage (Handelman 1981) . In this case it can be said to personify different kinds of opposition: between male and female, young and old, uncontrolled and controlled sexuality. The girl is moving from youth to adulthood. During the mehndi ritual the dangerous yet vital power of sexuality, embodied by the clown, is first incorporated and then made safe by the women surrounding the bride-to-be in the mehndi ritual. This is enacted symbolically: the clown is mocked, sometimes beaten and ultimately forcefully banished by the women.
The wedding ritual can be said to harness natural fertility for the sake of human The saint is regarded as a repository of infinite knowledge and powerful authority. His charisma is an embodied magic that permeates his whole persona, his very body, with the contagious power of God's grace, a power that persists even after his death when his grave becomes a shrine, the centre of a pilgrimage cult. As a conduit of God's grace in the world, his presence infects his surroundings, and any object with which he comes into contact, with blessing, a luminous quality that physically embodies a divine force for growth, fertility and multiplication. He projects inner peace -an aura of absolute, unquestionable, infallible authority.
The saint as charismatic fulfils the highest ideals of the society while at the same time appearing unique and beyond society. This effect of power is so compelling for followers that they believe him to reach into their minds, souls and hearts wherever they are, transcending physical obstacles of space and geographical distance. He thus knows the hearts of his disciples in Britain while for these British settlers, he and his lodge remain the centre of their cultural universe. Since cricket has become a part of professionalised mass media entertainment, its stars have become national heroes (Appadurai 1996 Lamb, which he won, highlighted the way race, gender, class and Empire are explosively conjoined in contemporary cricket (Werbner 1997b) . All this is a reflection of the masculine glamour and politicisation of the game.
Mehndi wedding rituals and, to a lesser extent, cricket are transgressive of strict 
Culture as discourse
Each symbolic space -familial popular culture, Islam, and cricket -has its own discourses. If, as I have argued so far, culture is, for migrant men and women, first and foremost a mode of transaction and relatedness, and second, of substantive embodiment, culture is also a discursive imaginary of selfhood, identity, subjectivity and moral virtue.
We have seen that in Britain Pakistanis live on the margins of three lived-in worlds: the South Asian, with its aesthetic of fun and laughter, of vivid colours and fragrances, of music and dance; the Islamic, with its utopian vision of a perfect moral order, and the nationalist Pakistani, with its roots in the soil, in family, community and national loyalties, which connect it to the postcolonial international community and Commonwealth, and to ideas about democracy sovereignty and fair play. The creative locus of these imaginaries, I have argued (Werbner 2002) , is the diasporic public sphere.
The identities evoked in public speeches and performances -of nation, local community, religion and diaspora -are at times fused, at times kept strictly separated. Diaspora from this perspective can be seen as a series of projected imaginaries of identity.
A focus on the diasporic public sphere enables us to shift from an analysis of 'culture' or 'religion' as essentialised, disembodied systems of meanings and prescribed practices to cultural performance through oratory and political argumentation. In this sense culture is indexical and historically constituted through practical knowledge and purposeful action. 16 Collective identities, in being continuously negotiated in relation to their imagined audiences, are never permanently fixed.
Remarkable in the case of Pakistani settlement in Britain have been the resources of time, wealth, effort and symbolic imagination Pakistanis have been willing to invest in their alternative public arenas. Equally marked has been the extent to which they are willing to mobilise to defend and protect these domains of public performance when and if they are threatened 'externally'. Investment is an act of creation; defence is an act of preserving that which has been created. It is in this space of pure Islam that virtual discourses of a global millennial Islam, responsive to current affairs, are articulated. At the very same time, the empowerment of subordinate groups -Pakistani women and young men -has led to the reproduction of community not merely as a domain of religious observance but as a site of popular 16 I use the notion of ''knowledge practices' to refer to an explicit discourse and its associated institutionalised practices, in the sense discussed by Foucault (e.g. Foucault 1972 ). This contrasts with the taken-for-granted, common sense assumptions embedded in the quotidian, Bourdieu's 'practical knowledge' (Bourdieu 1977) . 
The debate on Multiculturalism
The Rushdie affair was a cataclysmic event, a global crisis, a focus of multicultural debates worldwide. The argument in favour of multiculturalism put by liberal communitarians such as Charles Taylor is, first, that identities are grounded in specific cultures and moralities and to deny these is a form of discrimination (Taylor 1994) .
Second, that a pragmatic resolution of individual versus collective rights is possible, as Will Kymlicka (1995) also claims. And third, that the public-private distinction is highly ambiguous, as several scholars such Modood (1997a) , Rex (1987) and Parekh (1995a Parekh ( , 1995b have argued. Education, in particular, it has been argued, is ambiguously placed between the private and the public. To deny children of immigrant groups the right to learn about their language, culture or religion is to marginalise them. Fourth, it is widely recognised that many forms of racism, such as anti-Semitism or Islamophobia (Runnymede 1997), essentialise and biologise imputed cultural traits. Hence the distinction between race and culture is untenable in reality, these new liberals, such as Modood, argue (Modood 1997b) . Moreover, feminists have argued that universal individual rights disguise the hegemony of white middle class males and silence the legitimate voices and identities of others, that 'the modern category of the individual' has been constructed in a manner that postulates a universalist, homogeneous 'public' that relegates all particularity and difference to the 'private', and that this has negative consequences for women (Mouffe 1993: 81) .
But multiculturalism probably has more critics than defenders. They come from the socialist Left and the liberal Centre and Right. They include postmodern anthropologists, feminists, and human rights activists. They also, of course, include right-wing racists, traditionalists and nationalists.
On the Left the argument is that the superficial celebration of multiculturalismof exotic cuisines, popular music or colourful festivals and rituals -disguises continuing economic and political inequalities. Rather than addressing these, the state funds multicultural festivals and turns its back on real problems of deprivation, prejudice and discrimination (Hutnyk 1997) . Hence, multiculturalism and identity politics obscure the common oppression of the underprivileged within capitalist society and divide anti-racist movements (Sivanandan 1990: 51-52 passim) . This debate, anti-racism versus multiculturalism, shared oppression versus culture, obscures, however, as Anthias and Yuval-Davis have pointed out, the divisive potential of an equal opportunities policy that attempts to implement differential resource allocations to underprivileged and marginalised groups (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992: 180) . It co-opts leaders while dividing them through such minor investments. Feminists such as Okin (1999;  In a perceptive paper, Tempelman (1999) deploys a typology developed by Eisenstadt and Giesen (1995) , to distinguish three forms of multiculturalism:
'primordial', associated with the approach of Charles Taylor, 'civic', associated with Bhikhu Parekh, and 'universalist', with Will Kymlicka. According to this view, while primordial multiculturalism assumes an authentic, unchanging cultural identity, civic multiculturalism recognises that cultures are open, and calls for dialogue between and within communities. It fails, however, to address contexts in which such dialogue is refused or breaks down, as happened in the case of the Rushdie affair. Against that, universalist multiculturalism demands that both majority and minority cultures, whatever their differences, safeguard liberal principles of individual liberty and the right to dissent.
The difference between the latter approach and the openly anti-multiculturalist approached advocated by Brian Barry (2000) which I discuss below, would seem to be merely one of degree: the liberalisation of non-liberal cultures, according to Kymlicka, is to be achieved through dialogue, education and financial incentives (1999: 27) . But, as
Tempelman points out, the ultimate state sanction against illiberal cultural groups that refuse to change, is force, and this may 'provoke a backlash in which interference is perceived as an existential threat to the authentic identity of the community' (ibid.: 28).
In current human rights discourse, the right of individuals and collectivities to foster, enhance and protect their culture and traditions is enshrined. But at the same time, freedom of speech and from violence denies the absolute right of traditional practices, such as forced marriages, for example. Clearly, then, this implies that multiculturalism is fraught with potential contradictions once it is defined too rigidly. This is, of course, also where the liberal critique on multiculturalism focuses. Like others, Barry tends to reproduce a wider socialist and liberal suspicion that multiculturalism is, in reality, beneath the rhetoric, a conspiracy of state engineering.
Against that, my own argument has been that multiculturalism in Britain, as applied to immigrant minorities rather than territorial ones, is neither legal nor conspiratorial. In reality, it is a rather messy local political and bureaucratic negotiated order, responsive to ethnic grassroots pressure, budgetary constraints and demands for redistributive justice. It is bottom-up rather than top-down. This also means that there is no single 'just' blueprint for multiculturalism, even in a single country and certainly between countries (see also Samad 1997) . In different countries, multiculturalism refers to different struggles, depending on minority demands for recognition and a share of state or local state budgets. Beyond the struggles for local recognition, however, we need to recognise that multiculturalism has also become a global movement (Nimni 2003) , and hence that multicultural confrontations need to be located in history. 
Conclusion
In sum, then, the translocation of culture is a process of dislocation, transplantation and relocation, both painful and joyous, as immigrants invent and recreate a local culture and viable community, while they struggle to sustain British local and transnational commitments. In this process of translocation, culture cannot be conceived of simply as an instrumental badge of identity; it is, as I have argued here, a compelling moral reality, conferring role and agency, to be struggled over by cultural actors, even when it is hybrid, contested, permeable and open to change. So too, in a world of transnational migrations and blurred borders multiculturalism cannot be a neatly packaged once-andfor-all policy, or a series of loyalty tests devised by politicians in a futile attempt to create an illusion of order out of ambiguity and flux. It is, rather, a constantly evolving historical process of repeatedly negotiating difference and dialogical citizenship in the context of national and international conflicts, often beyond the control of the actors involved. In this respect multiculturalism is not simply about the squabbles over local authority allocations or the representativeness of self-appointed community leaders (although it is that as well). Nor is it about 'community cohesion' in the sense of local working-class solidarities. Multiculturalism in history must respond to radical, often global, symbolic challenges that often test the capacity of politicians and citizens. Such crises require extreme sensitivity to the vulnerability of minorities even as the state upholds liberal principles that may seem to entail painful communal compromises on the part of these minorities.
